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Perspectives on Cruzan:
The Sirens' Lure of Invented Consent:
A Critique of Autonomy-Based Surrogate
Decisionmaking for Legally-Incapacitated
Older Persons
by
JA&ms BoPP, JR.*
and
DANIEL AvrLA**
Then with heavy heart I spoke to my comrades thus: "Friends, it
is not right that only one man, or only two, should know the divine
decrees that Lady Circe has uttered to me. I will tell you of them,
so that in full knowledge we may die or in full knowledge escape,
it may be, from death and doom. Her first command was to shun
the Sirens-their enchanting notes, their flowery meadow. I alone
was to hear their song, she said. You for your part must bind me
with galling ropes as I stand upright against the mast-stay, with the
rope-ends tied to the mast itself; then I shall stay there immovably.
And if I beg and beseech you to set me free, you must bind me hard
with more ropes again."'
The Sirens: evidently they really sang, but in a way that was not
satisfying, that only implied in which direction lay the true sources
of the song, the true happiness of the song. Nevertheless, through
their imperfect songs, songs which were only a song still to come,
they guided the sailor towards that space where singing would really
begin. They were therefore not deceiving him; they were really lead-
ing him to his goal. But what happened when he reached that place?
What was that place? It was a place where the only thing left was
to disappear .... 2
Myths bump the consciousness at odd times, quickening the mind
with brief music, then melting in silence. An idea starts, bears new
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ideas, undergoes permutation perhaps, and then dies. Thus spins a
cycle of reasoning which at its end may barely know why it is there,
but still it turns to the once-heard rhythms of the original thought.
Yet the meaning may change and the context is altered. Thus, for
example, the grand idea of autonomy-to live and let live-may be
converted to "die and let die." So it is with the Sirens' lure of invented
consent.
By "invented consent," we mean that process of medical deci-
sionmaking whereby one orders care or discontinuance of care for
another on a "ghost writer" basis.3 The order, perhaps to disconnect
a feeding tube from an unconscious patient, issues from the patient's
surrogate as if it were the command of the soon-to-be deceased. The
order is, in reality, not authored by the patient, but ghost-scripted by
the surrogate.
Born of a myth and employing a myth, invented consent is the
practice of choice in many jurisdictions. 4 The myth is this: a person
incapable of choosing is capable of choosing.
American common law upholds autonomy, some argue, as the
basis of our legal existence.' From this premise comes the lure. Respect
for autonomy, the "right to choose," should extend to legally in-
capacitated persons, and if they cannot choose then someone must
choose for them, preserving their "autonomy" (and thus their legal
existence) by attributing the surrogate's choice to the incapable person.
When applied to choices between life and death, the myth that vo-
litional autonomy survives incapacity is the myth of the Sirens' song.
"Nearly unanimously, [the] courts have found a way to allow persons
wishing to die, or those who seek the death of a ward, to meet the
end sought." ' 6 Thus it is that those singing autonomy for nonauton-
omous others will consign those others to the place "where the only
thing left [is] to disappear."
3. The process also is called "substituted judgment." See Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 747-55, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428-32 (1977).
4. See In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn.
1984); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
5. "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); see Welch, Walking in Their
Shoes: Paying Respect to Incompetent Patients, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1617, 1623 (1989).
6. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, 110 S. Ct.
2841 (1990); see also A. MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 46-47 (1989 & Cum. Supp. 1991) (courts
in right-to-die cases have reached "substantial agreement" that competent and noncompetent
patients have the right to refuse treatment and "the interests of the state in opposition to this
right are virtually nonexistent in the case of competent patients and very weak in the case of
incompetent patients whose prognosis for recovery is dim").
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The mythic aspect of invented consent pertains not only to who
is consenting, but to what act constitutes consent. Respect for au-
tonomy, it is argued, demands that a patient's choice be found even
when none exists. That is, a patient's failure to refuse treatment in
an overt way before losing consciousness should not prevent a sur-
rogate from discovering a prior refusal somewhere in the mists of the
patient's previous lifestyle, values, preferences, or tastes. Yet again,
this form of consentmaking is geared toward accomplishing the pa-
tient's death. 7 Would not the athlete rather die than vegetate? The
couch potato, well, she never had a zest for life anyway, right? For
the now-permanently unconscious person, a surrogate must honor the
"choice" deemed implicit in the patient's predisabled lifestyle, and
that choice invariably is characterized as a decision to die rather than
exist impaired. Here the surrogate claims she is simply the editor, not
the author, paring the extraneous to highlight the evident, not in-
venting but only reporting the patient's "choice" to die.
The prime "beneficiaries" of invented consentmaking are those
persons medically dependent and disabled. This includes older per-
sons, particularly those rendered unconscious, perhaps permanently,
by illness, injury, dementia, or aging.
This Article critiques the practice of basing surrogate refusals of
life-sustaining care for older persons on an idea of "autonomy" far
different from the original understanding of autonomy. Invented con-
sent, or "substituted judgment," is promoted as the best means of
respecting an incapacitated patient's autonomy even though neither
the patient nor the purported exercise of choice would satisfy accepted
definitions of an autonomous actor or autonomous action.8 Invented
consentmaking radically alters the tradition and practice of informed
consent, abolishing in the process those protective legal restraints typ-
ically applied to medical decisionmaking for unconscious persons. It
is a Siren's call that must be resisted. This Article concludes, to par-
aphrase Homer's Ulysses, that when a surrogate begs and beseeches
us to set an unconscious patient free by removing life-sustaining care
to bring on the patient's death, we must bind the surrogate's powers
with more ropes again, to preserve from harm the patient's life, and
consequently, the patient's autonomy.
7. See Gorby, Admissibility and Weighing Evidence of Intent in Right to Die Cases, 6
IssuiEs L. & MED. 33, 51-52, 70-71 (1990).
8. See Liacos, Is "Substituted Judgment" a Valid Legal Concept?, 5 Issurs L. & Mm.
215 (1989): Welch, supra note 5, at 1629-34; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Society for
the Right to Die, Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 26-27, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (No. 88-1503); Brief of Amicus Curiae Concern for Dying In
Support of Petitioners at 15-19, 27, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503).
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I. The Paradigm Case: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health9
The practice of invented consent is better understood in a real-life
context. The analysis, therefore, begins with the case of Nancy Cru-
zan.
The Missouri Supreme Court, in a decision upheld by the United
States Supreme Court, blocked Nancy Cruzan's parents, appointed as
Nancy's co-guardians,' 0 from acting pursuant to the claim that Nancy
already had consented, or would consent if she were able, to the with-
drawing of nutrition and hydration provided by a gastrostomy tube."
Nancy Cruzan was permanently unconscious.
The Cruzan case is an appropriate paradigm for invented con-
sentmaking for two reasons. First, the record is extensive, created at
three different judicial levels; it provides the most complete legal de-
scription of invented consent in a real-life context available anywhere.
Second, the United States Supreme Court apparently did not preclude
other states from experimenting in this area, 2 thus leaving open the
possibility that other states will recognize invented consent claims sim-
ilar to that raised by the Cruzans.
The Cruzan case, the first "right to die" petition to reach the
United States Supreme Court, naturally will be the focal point of anal-
ysis in this area for years to come. Accordingly, the American Ger-
iatrics Society has noted:
Although Nancy Cruzan [was] only 32 years old, the ultimate dis-
position of the issue in this case [has] serious implications for the
care of the elderly. How the Court addresses this issue will determine
9. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), aff'g Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).
10. Nancy's parents were appointed her co-guardians and from this they derived their
authority over her; thus, this term is used to identify them throughout this Article.
11. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 427 (Mo. 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
After the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Cruzan, the co-guardians returned to the trial court
that had heard the initial petition to present new evidence bearing on Nancy's intent. The new
evidence involved the testimony of former co-workers who spoke to Nancy prior to her accident
and who claimed Nancy would have refused food and fluids. Transcript at 10, Cruzan v.
Harmon 11, No. CV384-9P (Mo. Cir Ct. Dec. 14, 1990). This evidence was found by the trial
court to be "clear and convincing" proof of Nancy's intent to refuse her present care. Cruzan
v. Harmon II, slip op. at 1. The court therefore authorized the removal of food and fluids
from Nancy, id. at 2, feeding was withheld, and Nancy died twelve days later on December
26, 1990. Malcolm, Burial is End to Long Goodbye for Nancy Cruzan, N.Y. Tiams, Dec. 29,
1990, at 1, col. 2.
12. See Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2846. See Bopp & Marzen, Cruzan: Facing the
Inevitable, 19 L. MED. & H.ALTa CA E -(1991) (forthcoming), for analysis of the Cruzan
decision and its potential effect on future caselaw.
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substantially the choices available to the elderly to plan the ways they
will live, and particularly the ways they will die.' 3
In the fall of 1987, Lester and Joyce Cruzan sought judicial per-
mission to withhold gastrostomy-provided nourishment from their se-
riously impaired daughter Nancy Beth Cruzan.' 4 Nancy was injured
five years earlier in a car accident and never regained consciousness.' 5
Doctors expected that while Nancy could live with nourishment for
up to thirty more years,' 6 her mental incapacity would persist.' 7 As
Nancy's court-appointed co-guardians, her parents believed that Nancy
would refuse further treatment and asserted that her right to refuse
nourishment was "paramount to any and all other rights in this case."'"
A hearing was held in probate court.'9 The parties included the
Cruzans, the State of Missouri (responsible for providing medical care
and financing for Nancy), and two guardians ad litem.2" Missouri op-
posed the Cruzans' petition. At the end of the hearing, the guardian
ad litem recommended to the court that the petition be granted, be-
cause "[u]nder all the evidence there has been a self-determination by
Nancy to refuse further treatment." 2'
The trial court ruled in favor of the guardians. 22 It found:
About a year prior to her accident in discussions with her then house-
mate, friend and co-worker, [Nancy] expressed the feeling that she
would not wish to continue living if she couldn't be at least halfway
normal. Her lifestyle and other statements to family and friends sug-
gest that she would not wish to continue her present existence without
hope as it is. 23
Holding that Nancy had a "fundamental natural right"24 to refuse care
in her circumstances, the trial court authorized the co-guardians "to
13. Brief of the American Geriatrics Society as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 2, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503).
14. Brief for Petitioners at 9, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503).
15. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2844-45.
16. Id. at 2845 n.1 (quoting Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc) (quotations omitted) (footnote omitted)).
17. Id.
18. Petition for Declaratory Judgment at 7-8, Cruzan v. Harmon, No. CV384-9P, (Mo.
Cir. Ct. July 27, 1988).
19. Specifically, the case was heard in the Circuit Court of Jasper County, Missouri,
Probate Division, Judge Charles E. Teal, Jr. presiding.
20. The guardians ad litem were appointed by the trial court to be the attorneys for the
ward, Nancy Cruzan, on the premise that Nancy's interests might conflict with those of her
co-guardians (parents). Though the guardians ad ]item were independent from the co-guardians,
they reached the same conclusion-that Nancy's treatment should be stopped. See Respondent
Guardian Ad Litem's Brief, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503).
21. Id. at 3.
22. Cruzan v. Harmon, No. CV384-9P, slip op. at 7-8 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 27, 1988).
23. Id. at 4.
24. Id. at 7.
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exercise [Nancy's] constitutionally guaranteed liberty to request [the
State of Missouri] to withhold nutrition and hydration. '25
Thus, the co-guardians and guardians ad litem, along with the
trial court, believed that Nancy had consented or would consent to
nontreatment, and argued that her feeding should be discontinued.
Three Missouri Supreme Court justices, 26 four United States Supreme
Court justices, 27 and numerous amici also eventually supported this
claim. Could it be that Nancy alone was silent?
Several important questions, each touching on Nancy's autonomy
interests, can be raised here. Did Nancy consent to nontreatment? If
she did consent, when was her consent given? If she did not actually
consent, does she still have an enforceable claim to effectuate non-
treatment? The proponents of Nancy's "right to die" in this case pro-
vided answers to these questions that are quite instructive.
A. Did Nancy Consent?
Curiously, the trial court made no finding on whether Nancy le-
gally consented to the withdrawing of her sustenance, except to say
that her "lifestyle" and various oral statements she made to family
and friends "suggest" that she would not "wish" treatment3 8 The
trial court characterized its final order as one authorizing the co-guard-
ians to exercise Nancy's liberty to consent for her.29 The guardians ad
litem, asserting on appeal that Nancy had "self-determined" to refuse
treatment prior to her incapacity,30 urged the United States Supreme
Court to find that the Missouri Supreme Court "erred in holding that
there was not sufficient evidence of Nancy Cruzan's refusal of life-
prolonging medical treatment." 3' Yet, the guardians ad litem conceded
that Nancy had never executed a formal declaration of her consent
to nontreatment, 32 and they considered her prior statements significant
more because they evidenced that Nancy would refuse treatment, not
that she did. 33
25. Id.
26. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 427 (Mo. 1988) (Blackmar, J., dissenting); id.
at 430 (Higgins, J., dissenting); id. at 441 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
27. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2863 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.); id. at 2878 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. Cruzan v. Harmon, No. CV384-9P, slip op. at 4 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 27, 1988).
29. Id. at 7.
30. Respondent Guardian Ad Litem's Brief at 3, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503).
31. Id. at 14.
32. Id. at 14-15.
33. Id. at 15-16.
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The co-guardians were more direct. In their brief filed with the
Missouri Supreme Court, they admitted that Nancy never consented
to nontreatment:
[The State of Missouri] argues at one point that these statements,
made in advance of [Nancy's] accident and not directed to specific
treatment for her, do not constitute informed consent to removal of
artificial nutrition and hydration .... Respondents [the co-guard-
ians] do not dispute this point. Initially Joe Cruzan consented to the
insertion of the gastrostomy tube, believing it might aid in Nancy's
recovery .... He is willing to provide similar consent for removal
of the artificial treatment now that her prognosis is hopeless.3 4
The co-guardians thus argued that the presence or absence of Nancy's
informed consent was irrelevant to the case.35 If Nancy never con-
sented to tube-feeding initially, they questioned why her consent was
necessary for nourishment to be withdrawn.3 6
The co-guardians' argument is precisely the paradigm argument
for invented consent that enjoys legal and ethical support today.3 7 An
automatic transfer of decisionmaking authority from the patient to the
surrogate, whereby informed consent is sought from the surrogate, has
important implications regarding patient autonomy as understood by
practitioners of invented consent. Even if the patient's consent is not
required, the surrogate still must act consistently with the patient's
proven or presumed wishes to somehow preserve patient "autonomy."
That is, the standard autonomy claim in "right to die" cases appears
not to be that Nancy must consent to nontreatment to gain our respect
for her autonomy, but that Nancy likely would refuse treatment, thus
obligating us to respect her autonomy by respecting and effectuating
that "probable" choice.
B. When Did Nancy Consent?
It is evident that the co-guardians, guardians ad litem, and trial
court all would re-phrase the question of Nancy's consent; they all
were satisfied that treatment could be withheld pursuant to actions by
Nancy considerably less deliberative than a formal expression of con-
34. Plaintiff-Respondents' Brief at 25-26, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988)
(No. 70813) (emphasis added).
35. Id.; Brief for Petitioners at 31, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503).
36. Id.
37. "As a general rule, the surrogate assumes the decisional authority possessed by the
competent patient at the point when the patient is determined to lack decisionmaking capacity.
In particular, this means that the physician's obligation to obtain informed consent from the
patient is transferred to the surrogate." A. MOSEL, supra note 6, at 258-59.
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sent.38 They might state the question this way: "When did Nancy re-
fuse, self-determine, or no longer want treatment?" Or they might
ask: "When were Nancy's caregivers required to withhold care as if
Nancy had issued her consent to nontreatment?" Again, the answers
provided are instructive.
The trial court located the moment of purported refusal for med-
ical treatment at the point "when the person has no more cognitive
brain function than our Ward and all the physicians agree there is no
hope of further recovery[,]" and the co-guardians "exercise our Ward's
constitutionally guaranteed liberty to request" nontreatment.19 Thus,
"[t]o deny the Co-guardians the authority to act" at this point "is
to deprive the Ward of the equal protection of the law." 4 Once the
co-guardians made their decision, the State of Missouri was bound to
carry out the co-guardian's request as if it came from Nancy herself.4'
The co-guardians and the guardians ad litem focused instead on
the period before Nancy's accident, when she was conscious. Nancy's
father and co-guardian Lester Cruzan testified in probate court:
Nancy was an independent, vivacious person. She enjoyed being out
of doors, tending her plants and her pets, and in general, living life
to its fullest. Knowing her as only parents can, and based on state-
ments made by her to her sister at the time of their grandmother's
death regarding the prolonging of life when there was no purpose
left to the life, it is our belief that she would not want the life support
continued in her present condition. Nancy has two sisters, both of
whom are in complete agreement with our request and our feeling
that this would be Nancy's request. 42
Thus, "Nancy's statements alone are enough to stop this artificial
treatment,"43 the co-guardians argued, and "[w]hen coupled with ev-
idence of her personality and what her family and friends believe Nancy
would want, there is no other outcome possible."" The guardians ad
litem concurred, opining that various statements made by Nancy be-
fore her accident, "together with her personality, character, and life
style," supported the conclusion that "were [Nancy] able to forecast
her present condition, she would demand that the feeding tubes be
removed." 45
38. For a discussion of what actions would constitute sufficiently deliberative and clear
expressions of consent, see infra Sections III.B. and IV.A.(3).
39. Cruzan v. Harmon, No. CV834-9P, slip op. at 7 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 27, 1988).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. Trial Record at 437-38, Cruzan v. Harmon (No. CV384-9P).
43. Plaintiffs-Respondents' Brief at 25, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988)
(No. 70813).
44. Id.
45. Respondent Guardian Ad Litem's Brief at 16, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (No. 88-1503).
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So when did Nancy refuse treatment? When she was unconscious
and therefore unaware of her present circumstances, as concluded by
the trial court? Or when she was still conscious, but yet unaware of
her future predicament? Did Nancy ever refuse treatment at all? Or
can the co-guardians justify their nontreatment request merely by sur-
mising that Nancy would refuse treatment? A simple inquiry about
Nancy's consent is more complex than appears at first glance.
C. If Nancy Never Consented To Nontreatment, Does She Still Have the
Right To Have Treatment Withheld?
The proponents of forgoing Nancy's care all agreed: Yes, Nancy
should be allowed to die, even if her consent to nontreatment cannot
be proven, because she retains a "right to be let alone." 46
The co-guardians grounded Nancy's right to refuse care in "tra-
ditional notions of autonomy" protecting persons from "[u]nwarranted
physical invasions of the body," and preserving "an individual's right
to self-determination." 47 The co-guardians asserted that Nancy's per-
manent inability to decide for herself whether to accept or refuse med-
ical intervention, and her apparent failure to consent formally to
nontreatment in advance of her incapacity, did not alter the obligation
to respect her autonomy. 48 They argued that Nancy's claim "[was] not
in literally voicing choices; it [was] in ensuring that [she] receives treat-
ment that reflects [her] interests and desires." ' 49 If Nancy's prior-ex-
pressed "beliefs and values,''50 and even her "lifestyle,' '' suggest that
she would want to die in her present circumstances, then her life-sup-
port should be terminated.
In effect, to preserve Nancy's "autonomy," her co-guardians
sought to invent her consent to die when none existed. How could this
conform with "traditional notions of autonomy"? Is the practice of
invented consent, as attempted in Cruzan and certain to be employed
in future cases, the best means of respecting an incapacitated person's
autonomy interests?
It is not. The theory of autonomy used to justify invented con-
sentmaking substantially differs from the classic understanding of au-
tonomy. To understand how, the theoretical premises of invented
consent must be examined.
46. Brief for Petitioners at 18, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Missouri Supreme Court at 19-20, Cruzan v.
Director (No. 88-1503).
50. Brief for Petitioners at 22, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503).
51. Id. at 33-34.
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II. Theory and Justification for Invented Consent
If, at its core, invented consent is a legal fiction, its proponents
assert it is a necessary fiction.5 2 When a person falls ill, and thereby
loses her capacity to choose her own fate, she no longer can defend
her interests by asking for help. Are her claims on our attention and
respect for her needs thereby relinquished? Are others free to disregard
her and her needs only because nature has stilled her voice? Of course,
the answer is no. Advocates of invented consent maintain that it is
the best means of acknowledging and responding to both the needs
and the interests of persons incapable of caring for themselves.
Why resort to fiction? Why not enforce a duty to care for all
persons that obligates others to provide assistance regardless of whether
a person can consent or not? Then no one would need to pretend that
the assistance was requested or consented to, because a request or con-
sent would not be required.
Fictitious consent, its proponents maintain, is necessary not just
because nature robs an incapacitated person of her ability to request
help, but because the proponents' system of ethics requires that all
acts of assistance be preceded by the consent of the person assisted.
Before we lend help, the "correct" course would be to determine
whether help was desired. Thus, for example, Justice Brennan asserted
in his Cruzan dissent that the State would have an interest in pre-
serving Nancy's life only after it "determined that she would want to
continue treatment. '5 3 This, in so many words, is the assertion that
autonomy is more important than beneficence. In effect, a person's
needs, as perceived by another, alone do not justify the assister's in-
tervention. Rather, the assister should ask the person needing help,
or otherwise determine whether assistance is what the person desired.
Why? Two reasons may be offered. First, we all should be free
to define our own needs. Second, we all should be free to reject an-
other's proffered assistance if we determine we do not need or want
that assistance.
Pretending that an incapacitated person consented to being or not
being helped preserves something more than her right to receive help
when she is incapable of requesting assistance; its proponents contend
that invented consentmaking also preserves the patient's freedom to
request or refuse others' help. In short, they argue that invented con-
sent preserves personal autonomy even though a person's physical well-
52. Liacos, supra note 8, at 221.
53. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2871 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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being, as defined by others, may be harmed by honoring a "refusal"
of help.
"Autonomy," therefore, is the goal of invented consentmaking.
What does this mean? According to proponents of invented consent,
decisions governing a patient's medical care must, above all else, be
"patient-centered.' ' 54 Respect for autonomy demands "that it is the
patient, not the physician, who ultimately decides if treatment-any
treatment-is to be given at all."' 55 Proponents of invented consent
assert that "[t]he patient's perspective is ... essential in determining
how [the patient's] well-being is to be understood. '56
Thus, the co-guardians of Nancy Cruzan argued that surrogate
decisions regarding Nancy's care should be based on "Nancy's own
interest in her life," and not on the interests of the state or the medical
profession.57 Yet, those seeking to withhold Nancy's.care, while es-
pousing the "patient-centered" principle of respect for autonomy, of-
ten disparaged Nancy herself.
Her co-guardians depicted Nancy as "an unconscious 'vegeta-
ble,' ' '58 and a "biological shell [that] is mechanically preserved. '59
According to the American College of Physicians (ACP), apparently
Nancy was no longer a human person: "Patients in a persistent veg-
etative state do not possess, nor do they have any potential ever again
to possess, any of those qualities of distinctively human life. . . ."60
Her life, the ACP concluded, "[did] not even rise to the level of 'mere
animal existence.'61 To the National Academy of Elder Law Attor-
neys, Nancy's life was simply "organic life." 62 The General Board of
Church and Society of the United Methodist Church argued that Nancy
was not alive at all, because "when the capacity for human relation-
ship is irretrievably lost, death has occurred regardless of what bio-
54. "In applying the value of autonomy to decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment,
we place the patient at the center of the decisionmaking process." HASTINGS CENTER, GUnnE-
LINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATmENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 7
(1987).
55. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2866 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Tune v.
Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (D.D.C. 1985)).
56. Glover, A Philosophical Analysis of Substitute Decision-Making: The Case of Ms.
Nancy Cruzan, 5 MIDWEST MED. ETHICs 10 (1989).
57. Brief for Petitioners at 17, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503).
58. Plaintiffs-Respondents' Brief at 12, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988)
(No. 70813).
59. Brief for Petitioners at 15, 38, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503).
60. Brief of the American College of Physicians as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 27, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503).
61. Id. at 28 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting)).
62. Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys in Support of
Petitioners at 6, Cruzan v. Director (88-1503).
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logical function can be sustained. ' 63 Even Justice William Brennan
characterized Nancy as being only "metabolically alive.'' 64
What sort of respect for autonomy is this, that reduces a per-
manently incapacitated person to a non-entity, yet demands that we
obey the "consent" of this person who never consented to nontreat-
ment and never will? The answer, if any, must be found in the def-
initions for autonomous persons and autonomous acts implicit in the
writings of those espousing invented consent.
A. Autonomous Persons: The Hologram Model
In the film Star Wars, 65 Luke Skywalker discovers a hologram
message from Princess Leia. After plugging a cartridge into the robot
R2-D2, Luke watches and listens as a three-dimensional representation
of the Princess gestures and speaks. The figure moves life-like before
Luke, but a swoop of an arm through the hologram beam reveals
instantly that the figure is just a picture, albeit a sophisticated one.
If the flesh-and-blood Princess were to stand next to her hologram,
and both were to offer a handshake, we would surely grasp the living
hand, not the electronic one. The real from the representational could
be readily distinguished.
Imagine now that Princess Leia is seriously injured by Darth Vader,
and lies permanently unconscious in a hospital bed. A hologram of
her life66 is playing in his room. Who is the real Princess Leia, the
silent dignitary in the bed or the active one in the hologram? Pro-
ponents of invented consent, we daresay, would choose the hologram.
63. Brief of the General Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503) (quoting
Lu'E ABUNDANT: VALUES, CHOICES AND HEALTH CARE, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESBY-
TERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.) 37.744 (Report of the Advisory Council on Church and Society
to the 200th General Assembly, 1988)). Justice Stevens in his dissent intimated the same
sentiment when he cited with approval the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division: "A
patient in a persistent vegetative state 'has no health, and, in the true sense, no life, for the
State to protect."' Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2886 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 465, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 543 (1980)).
64. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2868 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Star Wars (20th Century-Fox 1977).
66. It is crucial that the hologram records a portion of Princess Leia's life, as if the
camera followed her continuously throughout. If at some point, the Princess turned to the
camera and issued an advance directive, then this may constitute sufficient informed consent.
However, the premise of the hologram analogy is that Princess Leia never does indicate clearly
her treatment wishes. Rather, the hologram simply shows the Princess living her life; to the
proponents of invented consent, her vigorous image in and of itself becomes the "expression"
of her intent, as well as the "essence" of her existence.
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They stress, for example, that "[h]uman beings are transcendent
creatures. Real life comes from beyond bodily function." 67 More pre-
cisely, a person or life is to be viewed as more than "mere corporeal
existence." ' The essence of personhood is not flesh and blood, the
philosophers in this school assert, it is cognition 69 and a collection of
cognitive activities that constitute one's lifestyle. For example, Justice
John Paul Stevens argued in his dissenting opinion in Cruzan:
Nancy Cruzan is obviously "alive" in a physiological sense. But for
patients like Nancy Cruzan, who have no consciousness and no chance
of recovery, there is a serious question as to whether the mere per-
sistence of their bodies is "life" as that word is commonly under-
stood, or as it is used in both the Constitution and the Declaration
of Independence .... When people speak of life, they often mean
to describe the experiences that comprise a person's history, as when
it is said that somebody "led a good life." They may also mean to
refer to the practical manifestation of the human spirit, a meaning
captured by the familiar observation that somebody "added life" to
an assembly. If there is a shared thread among the various opinions
on this subject, it may be that life is an activity which is at once the
matrix for and an integration of a person's interests.70
From this perspective, the unconscious but breathing Princess Leia or
Nancy Cruzan might be less "alive" and thus less a person than her
life history, the remaining collection of practical manifestations of her
thoughts and feelings as stored in the memories of those who knew
her.
One justice of the Illinois Supreme Court has noted that the ho-
logram approach to surrogate decisionmaking requires "[a] surrogate
and the court [to] piece together any available testimony from [an
unconscious patient's] relatives and other sources to construct a per-
sona. They say that that image, if you will, then represents and decides
for the incompetent person. The entire effort is ... an exercise in
fictional characterization .... -71
67. United Methodist Church Amicus Curiae Brief at 9, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503)
(quoting Tan COVENANT OF Lns AND THE CARING CoMxUnITY, sec. II, ch. 5, at C.4 (Policy
Statement of the 195th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) 1983)).
68. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 433-34, 497 N.E.2d 626,
635 (1986).
69. "Most of what makes someone a distinctive individual is lost when the person is
unconscious, especially if he or she will always remain so. Personality, memory, purposive
action, social interaction, sentience, thought, and even emotional states are gone." PREsIDENT'S
COMMISSION FOR TH STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAv-
IoRAL RESEARcH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 174-75 (1983) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
70. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2886-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
71. In re Longeway, 133 II1. 2d 33, 63, 549 N.E.2d 292, 305-06 (1989) (Ward, J.,
dissenting).
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This imaginary construct of "person" more readily encompasses
the concept of autonomous persons as understood by invented con-
sentmakers. The "real" Nancy is the Nancy who talked, felt, and made
her own decisions. Throughout the Cruzan litigation, her co-guardians
carefully contrasted Nancy's prior independent existence with her status
as a total dependent. 72 Somehow, preserving her impaired "physio-
logical life" would do grave harm to the memories of Nancy in her
more autonomous days. According to Justice Stevens:
Nancy Cruzan's interest in life, no less than that of any other person,
includes an interest in how she will be thought of after her death by
those whose opinions mattered to her .... How she dies will affect
how that life is remembered .... [Her family] would likely have not
only a normal interest in minimizing the burden that her own illness
imposes on others, but also an interest in having their memories of
her filled predominately with thoughts about her past vitality rather
than her current condition."'
This view would direct the surrogate decisionmaker to disregard the
unconscious Nancy in favor of the memory of Nancy.
Thus, proponents of invented consent consider a decision to with-
hold food and fluids from an unconscious person to be patient-cen-
tered even though the patient would cease to exist as a result. The
principle of autonomy could be invoked because even though the un-
conscious person would be incapable of autonomous choices, the
memory of that person living autonomously could be incorporated
somehow into the surrogate's decisionmaking process. Under this the-
ory, decisions respecting the memories of persons acting autonomously
would then be patient-centered decisions, and therefore would be de-
cisions properly respectful of personal autonomy.
B. Autonomous Decisions: Dispositional Consent
Once directed to the "hologram" of a previously thinking person,
what should the surrogate look for? According to the Illinois Supreme
Court, "the surrogate first [must try] to determine if the patient had
expressed explicit intent regarding [the] type of medical treatment [at
issue] prior to becoming incompetent. ' 74 In other words, did the pa-
tient while competent decide one way or another on the treatment
question now facing the surrogate? Did the patient previously consent
to the action the surrogate now seeks permission to accomplish?
72. See Plaintiffs-Respondents' Brief at 12-13, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo.
1988) (No. 70813); Brief for Petitioners at 2-5, Cruzan v. Director (No. 88-1503).
73. Cruzan v. Director, 110 S. Ct. at 2885-86, 2892 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 49, 549 N.E.2d at 299.
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Most would agree that an explicit intent of the patient to accept
or refuse treatment should be honored if manifested by the patient
through some overt, clear decision. Hence, most would approve of
effectuating specific and informed decisions by a patient.
Proponents of invented consent, however, would go a step fur-
ther. The Illinois Supreme Court, for example decided: "Where no
[evidence of] clear intent exists, the patient's personal value system
must guide the surrogate." 75 The surrogate therefore is free to seek
proof of something other than actual consent by the patient. That
something has been called "dispositional consent," a phrase coined
by Joel Feinberg and discussed in his treatise, Harm to Self.76 Ac-
cording to Feinberg, dispositional consent is "unvoiced authoriza-
tion," I 77 a hypothetical act of consent that the surrogate presumes the
patient would be "disposed" to grant, if able.7 8 Feinberg admits that
"[d]ispositional consent ... is not actual consent, and can only be
presumed, not known."' 79 Yet he argues that this "plausible substitute"80
for actual consent under certain conditions would have the same sig-
nificance as actual consent. According to Feinberg, these relevant con-
ditions exist when:
1) there is very strong evidence (and even indirect statistical evidence
may be very strong) of the other's disposition to consent in circum-
stances of that kind; 2) there is no opportunity in the available time
to solicit consent directly; 3) the intervention reasonably appears nec-
essary to prevent substantial loss or harm to the other party."'
Feinberg distinguishes dispositional consent from what he calls
"inferred psychological states," which include "the silent desires,
wishes, approvals, or tastes of a person, as inferred from his own past
behavior or from actuarial tables."8s2 Feinberg acknowledges that by
themselves, "mere psychological willingness or passive acquiescence
[are] not authorization, " and hence cannot be considered actual or
dispositional consent.8 3 Yet he argues that inferred psychological states
"can be a relevant part of the evidential base for inferring disposi-
tional consent, and morally significant for that reason." 84 Indeed, "in
emergency circumstances, they may be the best guide we have to the
75. Id.
76. J. FEiNBERO, HARM TO SEL 172-88 (1984).
77. Id. at 173.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 180.
81. Id. at 187.
82. Id. at 181.
83. Id. at 173.
84. Id. at 187.
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actual consent [an incompetent person] would express if he could.''85
In addition, some courts endorsing invented consentmaking have
incorporated the concept of "patient values," extolling the virtues of
plumbing an evidentiary mist somewhat akin to Feinberg's "mere psy-
chological states" and "dispositional consent. ' 86 As the Illinois Su-
preme Court asserted, the surrogate decisionmaker must divine the
values held by the patient when competent and reach a decision con-
sistent with those values.87 The relevant values, according to the New
Jersey Supreme Court, must include "[a patient's] philosophical, re-
ligious and moral views, life goals, values about the purpose of life
and the way it should be lived, and attitudes towards sickness, medical
procedures, suffering and death.' '88
This focus on values, as amorphous as the subject may be, is an
essential component of "patient-centered" decisionmaking. Persons
are to be treated as ends, not means, and as subjects, not objects.8 9
What makes us "ends" or "subjects" is that which constitutes our
uniqueness. Thus, to respect persons is to appreciate those personal
characteristics that make each individual unique. Of moral significance
here is not the color of one's eyes or hair, but the substance of one's
life plans. A "life plan" consists of those choices made according to
goals that a person has adopted. 9° These goals are selected pursuant
to what the individual believes is good. What one believes is "good"
is that which one values. "Values," therefore, are "synonymous with
[freely chosen] personal beliefs, especially personal beliefs about the
'good,' the 'just,' and the 'beautiful,' personal beliefs that propel us
to action, to a particular kind of behavior and life." 91 Thus, whatever
values a person may hold will determine the life plan of choices she
pursues.
Because "it is often the case that desired goals are in direct com-
petition with each other," one proponent of invented consent has as-
serted, "A universal ranking of goals is highly unlikely, as individuals
85. Id. at 181.
86. See, e.g, In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1250 (D.C. 1990) ("The court ... should pay
special attention to the known values and goals of the incapacitated patient, and should strive,
if possible, to extrapolate from those values and goals what the patient's decision would be
.... "); In re Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 49-50, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299-300 (1989); In re Jobes,
108 N.J. 394, 415-16, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (1987).
87. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 49-50, 549 N.E.2d at 299-300.
88. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 415-16, 529 A.2d at 445 (quoting Newman, Treatment Refusals
for the Critically and Terminally Ill: Proposed Rules for the Family, the Physician and the
State, III N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTs. AN. 45-46 (1985)).
89. Pollock, Life and Death Decisions: Who Makes Them and By What Standards?, 41
RuTGERs L. REv. 505, 506 (1989).
90. Glover, supra note 56, at 10.
91. See H. Lawis, A QUEsTIo or VALUES 7 (1990).
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will balance personal goals and values differently. ' 92 As a result, each
person will have a unique individual life plan that must be respected.
Thus, "[w]hen we respect choices, we are allowing persons to function
as ends in themselves, as autonomous or self-determining." 93
This "patient-centered" approach is problematic in the context
of decisionmaking for persons no longer able to make their own de-
cisions. If respecting autonomy or autonomous choices is the goal,
how can one justify making a choice, any choice, on behalf of an-
other?
Proponents of invented consent dance to curious music when this
question is raised. One proponent admits, "[I]t is literally impossible
for someone to make an autonomous choice on behalf of someone
else. The choice is then no longer self-determined, but rather, other-
determined. ' 94 Yet, "respecting choices is part of a much richer con-
cept of respecting persons and their own unique identities. We struggle
to respect people and the integrity of their lives, not merely their ex-
pressed preferences." 95 Under this view, respecting autonomy does not
consist of just following another's decisions, but in making decisions
for another consistent with that person's values.
But is a particular decision ever obvious from a given set of per-
sonal values? Without a specific directive from a patient herself, the
surrogate decisionmaker can only guess and extrapolate, since there
are no clearly delineated routes by which one can find another's unex-
pressed "intent." How might the "consistency" of a surrogate's de-
cision be judged when the standard is as amorphous as personal
" values"?
A second problem facing the patient-centered approach is its re-
liance on conflicting assumptions. This approach assumes that, out
of deference to the patient's individual life plan and its unique sig-
nificance, a universal definition of "good" or "well being" cannot
and should not be applied in treatment refusal cases. This conflicts
with another common assumption. Inventing another's consent to die
often is justified by the assertion that physiological life without the
capacity for making choices or exercising one's liberty interest is a
universal disvalue, and sustaining such life is considered conceptually
inconsistent with any "reasonable" definition of well-being. 96
92. Glover, supra note 56, at 10.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 11.
95. Id.
96. This view recently was displayed in the case of Helga Wanglie, a patient in a permanent
unconscious condition at Hennepin County Medical Center in Minnesota. See Belkin, As
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As noted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan, "Nearly
unanimously, those courts [upholding invented consent] have found
a way to allow persons wishing to die, or those who seek the death
of a ward, to meet the end sought." 97 For example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court in In re Quinlan98 designed a theoretical template for
disvaluing a person's life according to the severity of her cognitive
impairments." The Quinlan court found that the state's interest in
preserving the life of Karen Quinlan, a woman in a permanent un-
conscious condition, was "weakened," and that because Karen's prog-
nosis was "extremely poor-she will never resume cognitive life," her
right to die prevailed. 100 This template has been applied in almost every
right-to-die ruling since.
The Quinlan approach involves an assessment of the relative val-
ues of living with permanent unconsciousness or death, by which death
almost invariably is preferred. 0' When applied in circumstances in
which a surrogate has only the patient's "values" as a guide, the Quin-
lan analysis encourages the surrogate to focus on those values pur-
portedly held by the patient that are consistent with the belief that life
without liberty is of no value at all.
By automatically scissoring a prior consent to die out of a flimsy
sheet of cardboard "values" or "dispositions," proponents of this
approach disregard the very uniqueness they claim they are respecting.
It is a contradiction to assert that only the patient's unique choices
should be at the center of any surrogate decision and at the same time
presume that all patients would be "disposed" to choose death if se-
riously incapacitated. Yet that is the approach taken in invented con-
sent cases.
Why is it that proponents of invented consent favor a process of
surrogate decisionmaking that posits the existence of holographic per-
sons and dispositional consent? This practice may stem from their
conviction that liberty is the essence of life, and thus is the primary
Family Protests, Hospital Seeks an End to Woman's Life Support, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1991,
at 1, col. 1. Despite prior expressions by Ms. Wanglie indicating her desire that "everything
[be] done" should anything happen to her, the hospital announced that it would seek to
remove the woman from her ventilator. Id. The hospital director told the press: "[W]e don't
feel that physicians are obliged to provide inappropriate medical treatment that is not in the
patient's medical interest." Id. The care was deemed "futile" and of no benefit because it
could not restore Ms. Wanglie to consciousness. Id.
97. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
98. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
99. "[T]he State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as
the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims." Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
100. Id.
101. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 422.
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value from which all other values take their measure. Proponents of
invented consent view autonomy, not life, as the cardinal good.
They argue that autonomy is an intrinsic good, not an instru-
mental good.'0 2 We respect personal autonomy not because its exercise
medically may benefit the patient in these cases, but because of the
principle of autonomy. As one commentator argues: "Respecting a
patient's autonomy does not necessarily entail concern for conse-
quences and thus can be at odds with a physician's vision of medical
benefit. When such a conflict arises, an approach.., that begins with
patient autonomy places a priority on adherence to that principle over
considerations of beneficial results." 0 3 Thus, if a patient or a patient's
guardian refuses treatment as an attempt to exercise personal choice,
that refusal should be honored even if it results in the patient's death.
Autonomy should be considered an intrinsic good: a goal to be met
regardless of any consequences, even death.
The corollary argument is that life is of only instrumental value.
That is, life has value only as long as a person can exercise her capacity
for liberty. Justice Brennan argued in his Cruzan dissent: "[T]he State
has no legitimate general interest in someone's life, completely ab-
stracted from the interest of the person living that life .... -04 Thus,
according to the dissent of Justice Stevens, when a person loses the
physical or mental capacity to make choices, her life should be pre-
served only if the patient had previously directed that her life be main-
tained.' °5 From this perspective, life is contingent on liberty and is only
a vehicle for liberty's exercise; absent liberty, life has no intrinsic value
for proponents of invented consent. The consequence of death, should
it follow, therefore would have little, if any, negative significance.
Thus, the end sought-vindication of autonomy-is being used
to justify a problematic means of achieving this end whatever the con-
sequences. If one must invent the appropriate consent by trolling
through a person's value system to capture the one value combination
that would approximate a decision to die, then so be it.
The Sirens' call may entice, but where will it lead? In the next
Part, the classic understanding of autonomy and its influence on pa-
tient care is examined. How invented consentmaking alters the tra-
ditional approach to caring for those persons competent and not
competent to care for themselves also is discussed.
102. Welch, supra note 5, at 1622-23.
103. Id. at 1622.
104. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2870 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
105. Id. at 2889 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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III. Impact of Invented Consent on Patient Care Tradition:
Grafting the Rootless Bough
What is autonomy and how does respect for autonomy within the
medical context reveal itself through the procedures and criteria typ-
ically used to obtain consent for medical decisionmaking? Proponents
of invented consent have formulated their own thesis, but their ap-
proach differs considerably from the traditional understanding of au-
tonomy and respect for autonomy, at least regarding patients unable
to make their own decisions.
While the proponents of invented consent appeal to the tradition
of informed consent and rely on much of the same terminology, in-
vented consent is more a rootless bough than a natural branch, grafted
to, rather than generating from, the traditional approach to patient
care.
The word "autonomy" comes from two Greek terms meaning
"self" (autos) and "rule" or "law" (nomos).106 It was a political term
originally, referring to self-governance within the Greek city-states.'07
"In moral philosophy personal autonomy has come to refer to per-
sonal self-governance: personal rule of the self by adequate under-
standing while remaining free from controlling interferences by others
and from personal limitations that prevent choice. 108 The traditional
view of autonomy relies on more limited definitions of "autonomous
person" and "autonomous action" than found in the theory of in-
vented consent. The following discussion highlights the differences.
A. Autonomous and Non-Autonomous Persons
According to the traditional view, those persons capable of "self-
governance" are those "who have the capacity to be independent and
in control." 9 If "the exercise of autonomy depends on an individual's
ability to make at least minimally reasoned choices ... [w]hen that
capacity is lacking-because of infancy, mental incompetence, or un-
consciousness-it would seem that the concept of autonomy should
have little significance."' 10
Classically, personal autonomy presupposes conscious and mature
persons, but does not foreclose respect for unconscious or immature
106. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 8 (1986).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Applebaum & Klein, Therefore Choose Death, 81 COMIMNTARY 23, 24-25 (1986).
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persons. In his treatise On Liberty, John Stuart Mill asserted that while
"[o]ver himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sov-
ereign," ' 1 this principle did not apply in the same way to all persons.
He wrote:
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to
apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We
are not speaking of children or of young persons below the age which
the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are
still in a state to require being taken care of by others must be pro-
tected against their own actions as well as against external injury. 1 2
Thus, Mill and other traditionalists would disagree with the prem-
ise of invented consent that a person incapable of choosing is still
somehow capable of choosing. The traditional position also conflicts
with the view that life without liberty is life without value and that
incapacity extinguishes the obligation to protect those who cannot pro-
tect themselves.
Personal autonomy, or sovereignty over one's own body and mind
as Mill described it, has two components: an individual's "right to
himself,""' that is, a right to bodily integrity, as well as a right to
"thorough-going self determination,"1 4 which protects one's mental
and volitional integrity. The "person" to be protected thus consists
of both a corporeal element and an incorporeal element.
Respect for persons, therefore, involves not only appreciation of
a person's mental faculties and the fruits of those faculties (i.e.,
thoughts, feelings, and choices), but also incorporates due regard for
a person's body, which by its integrated function bears a fruit of its
own-continued existence.
Thus, a battery can be committed upon a person, even when the
person is unaware of the physical intrusion.'"5 Consciousness and the
capacity to make choices are not conditions precedent to a personal
interest against bodily invasion."16 Moreover, when there is a duty to
provide care for another, failing to act consistent with that duty may
be actionable even if the beneficiary of the duty was unaware of the
breach because of mental or other incapacity." 7
Under the traditional approach to caring for competent patients,
both the patient's body and mind are the natural focii of "patient-
111. J. Mii., ON LmERTY 9 (E. Rappaport ed. 1988).
112. Id.
113. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 268, 104 N.W. 12, 14 (1905).
114. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960).
115. W. KEaON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 9, at 40 (5th ed. 1984).
116. See Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. at 268, 104 N.W. at 14-15.
117. See Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Lifesaving Medical Treatment: Bodily
Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RuTrERs L. Rav. 228, 251 n.117 (1973).
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centered" decisionmaking. The doctrine of consent obligates a care-
giver to obtain a competent patient's consent before undertaking any
nonemergency treatment.'1 8 The common law considered it a battery
for a surgeon to perform even a therapeutic operation upon a patient
without her consent. 19 This protected a patient's physical person from
unwanted touching or intrusion.
The doctrine of informed consent, emerging more recently, seeks
to vindicate a competent patient's interests in self-determination
through the exercise of her mental faculties. The caregiver must secure
the patient's "informed" consent, making a reasonable disclosure to
the patient of the nature and probable consequences of the proposed
treatment. 120 In effect, the traditional approach moved from a pater-
nalism model of decisionmaking to a participatory model in which
both patient and caregiver benefit "from a sharing of control over
many of the decisions arising out of the relationship.' '121
It is important to remember that for competent patients the tra-
ditional approach presumes that life and continued existence are ben-
eficial to the patient. Physicians are obligated under the duty of due
care to "help, or at least do no harm.' ' 22 As noted by the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research, "The primary basis for medical
treatment of patients is the prospect that each individual's interests
(specifically, the interest in well-being) will be promoted. Thus, treat-
ment ordinarily aims to benefit a patient through preserving life, re-
lieving pain and suffering, protecting against disability, and returning
maximally effective functioning.' 1 23 Particularly when a physician is
providing lifesaving care, the physician will be liable for any injuries
to the patient resulting from premature withdrawal of treatment with-
out the patient's consent.' 24 "This value of benefiting the patient has
long been treated as a foundational value-and sometimes as the foun-
dational value-in medical ethics.' ' 25
The traditional obligation to care for patients continues even when
the patient loses the capacity to make choices. The traditional ap-
118. Bopp, Reconciling Autonomy and the Value of Life, 38 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y
600, 600 (1990).
119. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
120. Salgo v. Stanford Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170,
181 (1957).
121. Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 580, 580.
122. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 106, at 10.
123. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 69, at 181.
124. D. MEYRS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING § 8:4 (1981 & Supp.
1989).
125. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 106, at 10.
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proach presurmes that even though a person's mind may no longer
function, the person's bodily existence must continue to be respected.
Respect under this approach takes the form of providing necessary and
effective life-prolonging care, since incapacity does not extinguish the
traditional duty of care. 12 This duty continues unless the care is in-
effective, 27 the treatment imposes severe physiological or psycholog-
ical burdens on the patient (such as pain),18 or clear proof of a prior
consent to nontreatment by the patient is discovered. 29
Thus, unlike the "respect" employed by practitioners of invented
consent, the traditional approach requires recognition that a "person"
exists whether or not the individual possesses the capacity for voli-
tional autonomy. The "person" is not located in some ephemeral con-
struct consisting solely of memories of the individual acting
autonomously; personhood exists in one's flesh and bones. When
choices to the contrary have not been made by the patient, respect for
persons requires duly-appointed caregivers to do just that-give care
even to incapacitated persons.
B. Autonomous Actions and Effective Consent
Just as the discussion about autonomous persons must necessarily
focus on the meaning of "person," the meaning of -"action" is an
essential question in the inquiry about autonomous actions. The def-
inition of autonomous "action" suggested by proponents of invented
consent is much broader than that endorsed by traditionalists.
As noted above, the traditional mechanisms of consent and in-
formed consent effectuate the individual autonomy of patients. Thus,
a particular action or class of actions that constitute the exercise of
individual autonomy structure the patient-caregiver relationship.
What is meant by "action"? Unlike invented consent, the tra-
ditional view restricts its definition of "consent" to events of com-
munication, often involving bodily movements cognizable by others.130
Unexpressed or otherwise unrecognizable desires, wishes, thoughts,
feelings, or emotions would not be characterized as actions and would
not qualify as autonomous actions. Thus a mere psychological or emo-
tional disposition could not rise to the level of consent or informed
consent under traditional theory.
126. 70 C.J.S. Physicians & Surgeons § 67 (1987). But see supra note 96.
127. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491
(1983).
128. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 365-67, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231-32 (1985).
129. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924-26 (Fla. 1984).
130. J. FEIwERo, supra note 76, at 176.
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Traditional theorists would recognize only those actions freely-
given, uncoerced, and intentionally directed as effective means of con-
sent or informed consent.13' More important to this discussion, these
actions must amount to authorizations. 132
That is, "the idea of an informed consent suggests that a patient
or subject does more than express agreement with, acquiesce in, yield
to, or comply with an arrangement or a proposal."'13 3 The action must
grant a privilege to another that otherwise would not exist, or cancel
another's obligations towards the actor.'3 There must be a transfer
both of authority and responsibility between the actor and the other: 35
"Thus, the crucial element in an authorization is that the person who
authorizes uses whatever right, power, or control he or she possesses
in the situation to endow another with the right to act.' ' 36
The traditional appreciation of personal autonomy requires that
consent provide authorization. Faden and Beauchamp explain:
Authorization is needed because of the kind of proposal tendered to
the person. Typically proposed in informed consent contexts is that
a professional do something, or refrain from doing something, that
directly and personally affects a patient or subject and that the pro-
fessional cannot rightfully, by reference to the principle of respect
for autonomy, do (or not do) on his or her authority alone. Fre-
quently, the proposal cannot with moral sanction be implemented
without the patient's or subject's authorization or permission. Thus,
mere assent or agreement is insufficient. 137
The lack of concern demonstrated by the co-guardians of Nancy
Cruzan for whether Nancy ever consented to nontreatment 138 is con-
trary to the traditional position that a patient manifest specific au-
thorization before treatment is withheld. In effect, the co-guardians
too readily dismissed a significant protection of Nancy's autonomy
interests on the mistaken belief that her interests somehow would be
vindicated without proof of her consent.
Finally, the "action" in question, particularly in the context of
informed consent, must be an exercise of choice-a decision to choose
one option rather than another. Autonomy necessarily presumes a con-
text in which choices are available. "Freedom will exist only where
there exists the possibility of choice .... "139 Thus, "[flreedom in its
131. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 106, at 277-80.
132. J. FEINBERG, supra note 76, at 173.
133. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 106, at 278.
134. J. FEINBERG, supra note 76, at 178.
135. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 106, at 280.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 295 n.12.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
139. Partridge, Freedom, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILosoPHY 221, 224 (P. Edwards ed.
1967).
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positive aspect is the activity or process of choosing for oneself and
acting on one's own initiative."' 14 Since consent and informed consent
are types of autonomous actions,' 14 proof of their occurrence should
consist of evidence that the patient made a decision to choose one
course of treatment (or to refuse treatment) over another.
According to Webster's Dictionary, the word "decide" comes
from a Latin term meaning "to cut off."' 142 Thus, a decision is an
action that cuts off one option in favor of another, representing a
clear-cut choice for or against a particular alternative. The more spe-
cific an expression of consent or refusal, the more likely that others
authorized to effectuate the patient's choice indeed will effectuate that
choice and not some other choice the patient intended to cut off from
consideration. Whether for competent or noncompetent persons,
"[a]ccuracy, therefore, must be our touchstone."' 43
The traditional approach requires the caregiver to disclose in-
formation that will allow the patient an opportunity to evaluate in-
telligently the medical options and their consequences.' 44 An informed
decision regarding medical care can be made only after the patient has
obtained "a full understanding of the nature of the illness and the
prognosis, the information necessary to evaluate the risks and benefits
of all the available treatment options, and the competency to make
a reasoned ahd voluntary decision."' 145
The disclosure requirement not only enhances the quality of the
patient's deliberation and final choice, but also increases the clarity
of the patient's instructions to caregivers. Recognizing this, courts fol-
lowing the traditional view have required that a decision to refuse
treatment be just as informed as a decision to consent to treatment.'4
Thus, the traditional approach to patient care would give oper-
ative legal significance to only a limited range of action-a range smaller
than that accepted by proponents of invented consent. Only statements
of decision, not expressions of preference or taste, would be treated
as autonomous choices.
The traditional view, while limiting the definition of autonomy
and restricting the scope of its application, nevertheless seeks to en-
courage patient-centered decisions, particularly for the most vulner-
140. Id. at 223.
141. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAmp, supra note 106, at 277.
142. WEBSTER'S 3D NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 585 (1986).
143. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2871 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
144. Bopp, supra note 118, at 600.
145. In re Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 57, 549 N.E.2d 292, 303 (1989) (Ward, J., dissenting).
146. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc); Leach v. Shapiro,
13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 397, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (1984).
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able patients-those unable because of incapacity to make their own
decisions. This is done through two basic mechanisms.
First, only those actions by the patient clearly representing the
patient's exercise of choice are to be honored. This avoids the pos-
sibility that a patient mistakenly will receive unwanted care or be de-
nied desired care. Second, the life of the patient, not "autonomy,"
must be accorded the highest value. The traditional approach en-
courages decisions by the caregiver that protect the patient's interests
in life and bodily integrity, unless those decisions clearly thwart the
patient's autonomous choices. This mode of decisionmaking protects
the patient from irreversible injury or death that could result from a
mistaken interpretation of her "values."
In effect, the traditional approach holds that the patient's exis-
tence is the core value in patient decisions. A caregiver's obligation
to provide care remains as long as a patient can benefit from such care
by continuing to live. This interest in living attaches irrespective of
the patient's capacity for autonomous actions. One's right to live does
not come into existence only when the patient "chooses" to live and
does not vanish solely because the patient becomes permanently in-
capacitated. While life is a prerequisite of autonomy, it is not a species
of autonomy that evaporates when autonomy is lost. A "person" wor-
thy of respect exists even when the personal capacity to make choices
does not. Decisions still can be "patient-centered" if they respect the
patient's right to exist without conflicting with a clearly exercised au-
tonomous decision by the patient.
Thus, the process of invented consent, which creates a consent
to die, should be rejected on the grounds that it not only co-opts the
patient's interest in volitional autonomy (creating a "choice" when
none existed), but also because it interferes with the patient's interest
in bodily integrity (allowing death-the ultimate form of bodily dis-
integration).
What invented consent proponents offer is a new definition of
"informed consent." They seek to distinguish between true autonomy
or consent and effective autonomy or consent. 47 True autonomy sat-
isfies all the classic elements of autonomous action, while effective
autonomy is treated as if it were truly autonomous action.148
"[Requirements for [effective] informed consent typically do not fo-
cus on the autonomy of the act of giving consent [as true consent
does], but rather on regulating the behavior of the consent-seeker and
147. R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 106, at 280-83.
148. Id. at 280.
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on establishing procedures and rules for the context of consent. ' 149
The question is whether the ersatz form of consent should replace
true consent as an "effective" act of personal autonomy deserving
respect. For reasons based on principle and practice, invented consent
should be rejected as a dangerous denigration of personal autonomy.
IV. The Shortcomings and Dangers of Invented Consent in
Cases Involving Legally Incapacitated Patients
Both principle and practice dictate the rejection of invented con-
sent in cases involving patients who are incapable of issuing their own
consent or refusal. Lifted from its proper context of medical deci-
sionmaking by competent individuals, volitional autonomy distorts the
decisionmaking process and endangers the compelling interests of non-
competent individuals.
A. Objections Based on Principle
(1) Violation of Bodily Integrity
Nancy Cruzan lived in a permanently unconscious condition.150
She required only gastronomical feeding, a form of care initiated soon
after she sustained her injuries. But for her inability to assist herself,
Nancy's body continued to function physiologically, and therefore she
possessed a bodily integrity conducive to life. In seeking to withdraw
her artificially-provided nourishment, Nancy's co-guardians attempted
to end her physical existence. They did not try to prove, however, that
Nancy actually consented to nontreatment and ultimately death. They
thereby sought to end her life without her consent.
The co-guardians argued, in effect, that given Nancy's permanent
impairment and the resulting quality of her life, their decision-lead-
ing to her death if carried out-would be based on Nancy's implied
consent. This claim stands the traditional doctrine of implied consent
on its head.
Traditionally, consent to treatment is implied in an emergency
that threatens death or serious bodily harm when the treatment will
preserve life or prevent serious injury.15' For the co-guardians' ar-
gument to prevail, Nancy's continued life, and not the threat of death,
149. Id.
150. See supra text accompanying note 17.
151. W. PRossm', TuE LAw oF TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1971).
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would have to have been considered an emergency condition to be
eliminated, a continuing harm to her interests.
This would require a philosophical shift in outlook, whereby life
without consciousness would be deemed life unworthy of living. If
transformed into an objective standard, this outlook would mandate
a societal presumption that all "reasonable persons" in Nancy's con-
dition would have consented to nontreatment, thus devaluing the lives
of all similarly-situated, vulnerable persons. If incorporated into a sub-
jective process of invented consent or "substituted judgment," this
approach would be unsatisfactory because "it is inconsistent with our
fundamental commitment to the notion that no person or court should
substitute its judgment as to what would be an acceptable quality of
life for another."' 152
(2) Autonomy Lapses with Incapacity but Other Rights Remain
The fictions of invented consent and "substituted judgment" pre-
suppose that a person's autonomy interests survive incapacity and thus
must be respected. This view is correct only to a point. To the extent
that autonomy refers to decisions already made and communicated by
the patient before losing the capacity to make further choices, then
it is true that the patient's interest in having those choices honored
must survive incapacity. The incapacity does not affect those prior
decisions: it did not prevent those prior choices from being made and
communicated and does not, by itself, extinguish the responsibility of
others authorized by the patient to act according to those prior de-
cisions.
This view differs, however, from the invented consent propo-
nents' view that the patient's authority to decide for herself auto-
matically shifts upon incapacity to a surrogate, giving the surrogate
the freedom to act as if the surrogate were the patient. As noted by
the Supreme Court in Cruzan, it "begs the question" to presume that
a surrogate has the right to effectuate any particular decision on the
patient's behalf, without evidence that the decision indeed was the
patient's own.'53
But proponents of invented consent argue that the patient's right
to autonomy must be transferred to a surrogate in order to preserve
the right. The very transfer of authority, however, erodes the right,
if done without the consent or direction of the patient. Because the
152. In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 530, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613,
534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892 (1988).
153. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990).
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patient no longer is capable of exercising this right on her own, and
because such a right evaporates once placed in the hands of another,
the right of autonomy is a wholly personal liberty that lapses upon
incapacity.
Other rights survive, however. As noted above, an incapacitated
patient has a right to the effectuation of decisions regarding her prop-
erty and personal interests made prior to incapacity. In addition, the
patient retains those rights arising out of the patient-doctor and other
professional caregiver relationships. Those services explicitly and im-
plicitly contracted for prior to incapacity must be provided, unless
capacity itself is an express or implied condition of release. Thus, the
physician still may be obligated to provide necessary and ordinary life
support such as tube-feeding, but need not provide, for example, eye-
glasses if the patient loses consciousness. The physician's authority to
act on the patient's behalf arises from her legal relationship as fi-
duciary to the patient, not from any notion of patient autonomy.
Finally, the incapacitated patient retains the right to live and to
exist free of unwarranted bodily intrusions. These rights arise from
state and federal guarantees of due process and equal protection, as
well as from common law and statutory sources. These rights are not
autonomy-based: their enforcement does not depend on an initial de-
cision by the patient to live and to live free of bodily intrusions. These
rights are passive1 54 because they attach irrespective of any invocation
of a patient's autonomy. Nonetheless, these rights are important pre-
conditions to a persons's capacity to make choices. A person obviously
must be alive and must possess bodily existence before she can ever
assert or exercise her right to choose. This right, however, like other
rights arising from sources other than the patient's autonomy, does
not disappear upon incapacity.
Thus, a surrogate may be authorized under law, particularly as
a court-appointed guardian charged with protecting the patient's best
interests, to make decisions protecting the patient's rights to live and
to maintain bodily integrity. Again, the source of authority is not pa-
tient autonomy but rather the state's parens patriae powers.
It is, then, both possible and necessary to make "patient-cen-
tered" decisions for unconscious persons without resorting to the fic-
tion of invented consent. An incompetent patient is not an empty shell,
and decisions that take her "passively-attached" rights into account-
when there are no autonomy-based rights arising from the patient's
154. See Robertson, Is "Substituted Judgment" a Valid Legal Concept?, 5 Issts IN L. &
MED. 197, 213 (1989).
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prior decisions-constitute the fullest respect for that patient.
(3) Invented Consent Is Not Informed Consent
The final objection based on principle is that invented consent,
because it relies on a surrogate's interpretation of the patient's values
and lifestyle, lacks any similarity to informed consent. There may be
no identifiable act of consent, no opportunity to be informed, and
ultimately no patient participation in the process. The practice is wholly
other-directed.
By necessity, a surrogate must stand outside and only can peer
in at the patient's system of beliefs. Even family members and spouses
may not fully comprehend which goals are significant and which are
not.
Because of a patient's unexpressed goals and desires, a surrogate
may be unable to correctly determine the most likely decision a patient
would have made. Thus, a surrogate must invent rather than discern
a patient's unvoiced authorizations and follow these "authorizations"
as if, not because, the patient decided on her own. This determination
is inherently subjective, and "a third party acting on the patient's be-
half often cannot say with confidence that his treatment decision for
the patient will further rather than frustrate the patient's right to con-
trol his own body."' 55
In not requiring tangible evidence of "consent," relying instead
on a surrogate's interpretation of a patient's personal predilections,
invented consent has no analogue in the law. Transfers of property,
agreements for services, and designations of agency all depend on overt
actions or other objective evidence of intention to define the rights
and duties of the parties.
Under contract theory, "[i]t is a necessary requirement in the na-
ture of things that an agreement in order to be binding must be suf-
ficiently definite to enable a court to give it exact meaning."'15 6 Thus,
"lain expression of desire or hope is not of itself an offer which will
become a contract on acceptance by an adversary party."'' 57 Moreover,
in a contract in which the occurrence of some condition will extinguish
a party's duty under the contract (a condition subsequent), "the intent
to create a condition subsequent must appear expressly or by clear
155. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985).
156. Whitelaw v. Brady, 3 Il1. 2d 583, 590, 121 N.E.2d 785, 790 (1954) (quoting 1 S.
WIMLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 37, at 98 (rev. ed. 1936)).
157. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 46 (1963).
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implication."'5 8 Forfeitures of contract rights otherwise due and en-
forceable are not favored by the law,' 59 and therefore evidence of in-
tent is particularly important. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals
has recognized the connection between the issues surrounding consent
to treatment or nontreatment and evidentiary requirements in other
areas of the law:
There are numerous instances in which the law refuses to recognize
the exercise or waiver of an important right unless the intent to do
so is clearly manifested .... [Thus] it cannot be seriously urged that
it would be "unrealistic" for the law to accord the same protections
to the individual's life and right to survive, as have long been ac-
corded to the individual's land and pocketbook.'6
Though the current practice of informed consent has its short-
comings, 161 the legal requirements of disclosure and consent have im-
pressed upon the medical profession the importance of the patient's
perspective in medical decisionmaking:
Physicians had heretofore considered the physician-patient relation-
ship by beginning from the patient's submission to the physician's
professional beneficence. The law [of informed consent] enlarged
that perspective by... emphasizing instead that patients voluntarily
initiate the relationship and have the right to define its boundaries
to fit their own ends ... [thus] demonstrating to medicine the va-
lidity of autonomy concerns.' 62
At the very least, informed consent requires the patient's consent;
mere suppositions about what the patient will or will not consent to
are insufficient. A doctor cannot simply guess what the patient wants
done, but must disclose to the patient all necessary information about
alternatives and consequences and then obtain the patient's authori-
zation to proceed. In the event of incompetency, the physician must
"do no harm" and must maintain the patient's status quo by not sub-
jecting the patient to further injury.
Unlike invented consent, informed consent relies on fact, not fic-
tion. Patients capable of giving informed consent are given the op-
portunity to clearly refuse or consent to treatment or non-treatment.
Patients not capable of giving informed consent nonetheless are pro-
tected under the physician's duty of due care. Proof of a condition
subsequent extinguishing that duty of care must show that the patient,
158. Alaska ex. rel. Hammond v. Allen, 625 P.2d 844, 848 (Alaska 1981) (quoting Lowe
v. Copeland, 125 Cal. App. 315, 321, 13 P.2d 522, 525 (1932)).
159. Id.
160. In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 n.4, 531 N.E.2d 607,
614 n.4, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 893 n.4 (1988).
161. See Katz, Disclosure and Consent, in II Gmcancs AND Tm LAW 121, 122 (A. Milunsky
& G. Annas ed. 1980).
162. R. FADnE & T. BEAucHAmi, supra note 106, at 142-43.
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before incapacity, gave her informed consent to nontreatment,163 or
that effective means of sustaining life or health are no longer avail-
able. 64
B. Objections Based on Practice
As a matter of practice, invented consent destroys the procedural
protection against patient abuse found in the law of informed consent
and "best interests" decisionmaking. When a surrogate bases a med-
ical decision on the surrogate's opinion of the patient's wishes and
values, rather than the patient's interests in life and health, invented
consent eviscerates the objectivity needed to make decisions truly re-
spectful of all the patient's interests. Decisions resulting in the pa-
tient's death obviously are irreversible. Inventing consent to hasten the
patient's demise, therefore, invites abusive practices with no oppor-
tunity for correction.
(1) Proximity Breeds Projection
Invented consent, according to one commentator, requires the
substitute decisionmaker to "share the life-world of the [patient] ...
not only comprehend[ing] the biography of the individual, but ideally
[becoming] a part of it."16 The surrogate must decide for the inca-
pacitated patient as if she were the patient. Yet, by "don[ning the
patient's] mental mantle," " the surrogate risks losing the objective
distance necessary for rational and compassionate decisionmaking.
The process of "identifying" with the patient's perspective so
completely that the surrogate's identity meshes with that of the patient
involves a risk of projection and overidentification.' 67 The surrogate
may not be able to shed completely her own persona with its inte-
gration of memories, feelings, desires, and goals. The surrogate may
carry into the process her own feelings about the patient, about sim-
ilarly situated persons, and about similar circumstances she herself is
facing. The surrogate, however, is capable of autonomous action and
the incapacitated patient is not. The patient cannot defend her own
perspective if the surrogate's perspective slides in to fill in the blanks.
163. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
164. D. MEYERS, supra note 124, § 8:14, at 155.
165. Glover, supra note 56, at 11.
166. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752, 370
N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977) (quoting In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 545, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 288
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962)).
167. R. PurTEo, HEALTH PROFESSIONAL AND PATIENT INTERACTION 160-62 (3d ed. 1984).
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The surrogate may project her own fears of dependency onto the
patient-editing memories of the patient to reflect only certain man-
ifestations of the patient's fear of dependency. The surrogate may
overidentify with the patient, leading to an "I-know-how-you-feel"
reaction that encourages the surrogate to act upon her own insecur-
ities.16 In the end, the surrogate's capacity to act autonomously allows
her wishes, desires, and values to motivate a decision regarding the
patient. Because the surrogate is supposed to represent the patient, it
is easy for the surrogate to claim that her decision is the patient's as
well.
The risks of projection and overidentification by health care
professionals in their relationships with competent patients are well
known. 169 When they occur, these problems hinder the professional's
ability to see the patient as an individual.1 70 Physicians and other care-
givers therefore are advised to maintain an appropriate distance from
their patients "until the uniqueness of the other person emerges.' 7'
Invented consent, however, encourages precisely the type of behavior
that leads to these problems.
(2) Insulation Invites Abuse
Vesting surrogate decisionmakers with the authority to divine a
patient's values insulates the surrogate's decision from review. The
whole idea of invented consent is that the incompetent patient should
be free to have effectuated on her behalf any choice available to her
when competent. Even if a particular choice conflicts with society's
view of what is best for the patient, the patient's autonomy interests
protect her right to that choice irrespective of its rationality. The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court asserted that "impos[ing] a solution
on an incompetent [patient] based on external criteria" would conflict
with the patient's personal rights to autonomy and integrity. 72 Thus,
that court rejected the objective "best interest" standard traditionally
applied in medical decisionmaking for incapacitated patients. If no
"objective" criteria can be applied to measure the legitimacy of sur-
rogate decisions, then what limits are there on the surrogate?
There is little comfort in an assurance that the surrogate must
decide as the patient would decide. If the patient indeed has not de-
168. Id. at 162.
169. Id. at 160-62.
170. Id. at 161.
171. Id. at 162.
172. In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 566, 432 N.E.2d 712, 720 (1982).
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cided, then any claim that the patient would decide in a particular way
is only a prediction based on the surrogate's own opinion. The only
person qualified to critique the surrogate would be the patient, but
the patient is unavailable to challenge the surrogate's decision. Thus,
no one can authoritatively determine whether the surrogate's invented
consent would conform to the patient's unformed decision.
Proponents of invented consent assert that "objective" decision-
making has its own risks. 173 One commentator argues, "All treatment
decisions .. .are 'tainted by idiosyncrasy." 1 74 Because "[d]ecisions
about medical treatment are inherently subjective and cannot be sep-
arated from the values and preferences of the decisionmaker,' ' 7 5 even
"best interest" determinations may be based on subjective, personal
opinions. 76 "The language of 'medical necessity' is sometimes used
to mask the value judgments being made."'' 77 The Supreme Court of
Illinois thus rejected the "best interest" approach in favor of sub-
stituted judgment: "The problem with the best-interests test is that it
lets another make a determination of a patient's quality of life, thereby
undermining the foundation of self-determination and inviolability of
the person .... 178 In essence, the argument is that "if treatment
decisions are going to be based on someone's value influenced opinion,
should it not be the patient's opinion? This is what substituted judg-
ment is all about." 179
It is true that certain variations of the "best interest" test apply
"objective" criteria that actually incorporate subjective evaluations of
a patient's interests based on estimations of the patient's quality of
life. The Arizona Supreme Court, for example, formulated the fol-
lowing "best interest" criteria: "[Rlelief from suffering, preservation
or restoration of functioning, and quality and extent of sustained
life.' 180 Another commonly used approach, the Quinlan "template,"
which asserts that a state's interest in preserving life diminishes when
cognitive function wanes,"' is vulnerable to the same criticism. These
variations of the "best interest" approach encourage the decision-
maker to subjectively discount the value of life for permanently or
severely impaired persons.
173. Welch, supra note 5, at 1634-38.
174. Id. at 1637 (quoting Clayton, From Rogers to Rivers: The Rights of the Mentally Ill
to Refuse Medication, 13 Am. J.L. & MED. 7, 19 (1987)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1636.
178. In re Longeway, 133 III. 2d 33, 49, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1989).
179. Welch, supra note 5, at 1637.
180. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 222, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (1987).
181. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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Not all "best interest" approaches, however, are the same. The
Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan employed an analysis that placed
"an express, affirmative duty on guardians to assure that the ward
receives medical care [and other services that are needed]." 18 2 Under
the Cruzan analysis, the duty to provide care could not be qualified
by the ward's "diminished" quality of life'83 and would continue as
long as medical care effectively sustained life and placed no "exces-
sive" burden on the patient. 84 The interest in preserving life outweighs
a person's interests in dying if that person did not specifically choose
to die. 85 This approach avoids the subjective quality of life factors
found elsewhere, and thus offers a satisfactory approach that properly
respects personal interests.
(3) The "Fox-Rules-the-Coop" Dilemma
Because of their incapacity, patients unable to make their own
decisions must depend on others, including surrogate decisionmakers,
for the protection of their rights and interests. These patients, par-
ticularly the elderly, are especially vulnerable to abuse and neglect,
sometimes from the very persons responsible for meeting their needs
and making decisions on their behalf. 86 Thus, the "assumption is
questionable" that "the proxy who is deciding on [the vulnerable per-
son's] behalf should naturally occupy the role of advocate.' 18 7
Proponents of invented consent argue that relatives of an inca-
pacitated person are the most appropriate decisionmakers and there-
fore should be given broad discretion to make decisions on the person's
behalf. The "most obvious decision-makers are those who love us and/
or are obligated to care for and about us," writes one proponent:
"Family and friends most closely fit these requirements."'' 88
According to a recent congressional report, 189 however, family
members are most likely to be the perpetrators of elder abuse.' 9' Based
182. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
183. Id. at 420.
184. Id. at 421.
185. Id. at 420-22.
186. See Kayser-Jones & Kapp, Advocacy for the Mentally Impaired Elderly: A Case Study
Analysis, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 353, 356-62 (1989) (An elderly mentally impaired nursing home
patient died of apparently treatable infection when her son, who had not visited his mother
in two or three years, told the attending physician that there was "nothing to save" and that
the family didn't want anything "elaborate" done.).
187. Id. at 362.
188. Glover, supra note 56, at 11.
189. REPORT By nHo CnuA OF Tm Surcomn. ON HEALTH AND LONG-TE M CARE OF
Tm HOUSE SELCT CoMM. oN AoING, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., ELDER ABUSE: A DECADE OF
SHAME AND INACTION (Comm. Print 1990).
190. Id., Executive Summary at XIV.
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on data from adult protective services agencies from forty-three states,
the report concluded that approximately 1.5 million older adults may
be victims of abuse each year:
The majority of elder abusers are relatives of the victims, often a son
or daughter with whom the elderly individual resides. The States in-
dicated that, on average, only 25 percent of abusers are caretakers
unrelated to the elderly victims. Thus, nationally, up to 3 of 4 elder
abusers are family members.' 9'
Thus, in many cases family members may want to act contrary to the
express decisions of older relatives and against their best interests. 192
If given broad authority to decide on behalf of these vulnerable per-
sons, the family members who choose to ignore the patient's interests
are left "effectively unaccountable.' ' 193
Even when family members do not seek to harm their incapac-
itated relatives intentionally, the process of invented consent is still
subject to great risk of error. "[R]esearch suggests that older patients
rarely offer even informal advance direction about treatment prefer-
ences in the form of discussions with their younger relatives, unless
they have already developed a serious chronic illness."' 94 Even then,
these conversations are typically "casual," "general," or "indi-
rect."' 195 Family members who are "physician-selected" to make de-
cisions on behalf of incompetent relatives may lack sufficient knowledge
about their relatives' prior treatment decisions. 196 Not surprisingly, one
study found that recommendations by family members differed from
the patients' actual decisions from twenty-four to fifty percent of the
time. 197
The same difficulties confront physicians, 198 nurses, 199 and court-
appointed guardians.2° Professionals are no more adept than family
members at divining the patient's desires in these cases.
In sum, invented consent invites "incompetent patients' genuine
interests to be quietly and conveniently subordinated to the interests
of others."'20' At the very least, invented consent enables "those who
191. Id.
192. Kayser-Jones & Kapp, supra note 186, at 362.
193. Id.
194. Zweibel & Cassel, Treatment Choices at the End of Life: A Comparison of Decisions
by Older Patients and Their Physician-Selected Proxies, 29 GERONTOLOosST 615, 615-16 (1989).
195. Id. at 616.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 618.
198. Uhlmann, Pearlman & Cain, Understanding of Elderly Patients' Resuscitation Prefer-
ences by Physicians and Nurses, 150 W.J. MED. 705, 705 (1989).
199. Id.
200. Kayser-Jones & Kapp, supra note 186, at 365-70.
201. Dresser, Life, Death and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden
[Vol. 42
seek the death of the ward, to meet the end sought" with little re-
sistance or oversight.2-
For these reasons, the doctrine of invented consent diminishes
rather than enhances the interests of persons with long-term inca-
pacities in autonomy and bodily integrity. This practice subjects these
patients to the threat of a wrongful or erroneous waiver of their right
to live and receive necessary medical care. By increasing the chance
that the patient will be denied life-sustaining medical treatment against
her will and contrary to her best interests, invented consent can hardly
be called "patient-centered."
Conclusion
The goal of "patient-centered" decisionmaking can be served best
by allowing duly-appointed surrogates to make decisions regarding
medical treatment and care for incapacitated patients only when the
particular decision is consistent either with a prior authorization of
the patient or with the patient's best interests in life and bodily in-
tegrity. If before her incapacity, the patient decided to refuse treat-
ment and communicated that decision clearly, then her autonomy
interest is vindicated by effectuating that decision, subject to appro-
priate review.
Absent a prior decision by the patient, the patient's remaining
interests in life and bodily integrity should be respected by requiring
the surrogate decisionmaker to act in conformance with the preser-
vation of those interests. A decision to maintain ordinary and effective
life-prolonging care does not contravene an incapacitated patient's au-
tonomy interest when the patient has failed to exercise her right to
refuse such care before incapacity. This policy would encourage per-
sons concerned about the preservation of their autonomy to make de-
cisions before incapacity in a manner that ensures the respect of others.
Values in the Law, 28 Aiuz. L. Rav. 373, 390 (1986).
202. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
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